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1he Republic of Fiji went to the polls in May 1992, its first election since
the military coups of 1987 and the sixth since 1970, when the islands
became independent from Great Britain. For many people in Fiji and out-
side, the elections were welcome, marking as they did the republic's first
tentative steps toward restoring parliamentary democracy and interna-
tional respectability, and replacing rule by decree with rule by constitu-
tionallaw. The elections were a significant event. Yet, hope mingles eerily
with apprehension; the journey back to genuine representative democracy
is fraught with difficulties that everyone acknowledges but few know how
to resolve.
The elections were held under a constitution rejected by half of the pop-
ulation and severely criticized by the international community for its
racially discriminatory, antidemocratic provisions. Indigenous Fijian po-
litical solidarity, assiduously promoted since the coups, disintegrated in
the face of the election-related tensions within Fijian society. A chief-spon-
sored political party won 30 of the 37 seats in the 7o-seat House of Repre-
sentatives, and was able to form a government only in coalition with other
parties. Sitiveni Rabuka, the reluctant politician, became prime minister
after gaining the support of the Fiji Labour Party, which he had over-
thrown in 1987, and despite the opposition of his predecessor and para-
mount chief of Lau, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. In a further irony, a consti-
tutional system designed to entrench the interests of Fijian chiefs placed a
commoner at the national helm. On the other side of the political divide,
the triumphant 1987 coalition of the National Federation Party (NFP) and
The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 5, Number 2, Fall I993, 275-30I
© I993 by University ofHawai'i Press
275
THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1993
the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) disintegrated in the weeks before the elections,
split over the best strategy to restore Fiji to genuine parliamentary democ-
racy.
Ironies abound, as do uncertainties about Fiji's immediate political
future. Contemporary Fiji politics is precariously poised, pulled in con-
trary directions by the competing, and perhaps incompatible, aspirations
of the country's ethnic groups and social classes. At one end of the politi-
cal spectrum is the unequivocal call by powerful sections of Fijian society
to turn Fijian culture back to its pristine setting and entrench permanent
Fijian control of the political process. At the other end is the equally deter-
mined effort to turn Fiji away from the politics of communalism and tradi-
tionalism toward a political order based on principles of racial equality
and justice. The elections did little to heal the wounds in Fiji politics.
Hence the tension, the ambivalence.
1987 AND ITs AFTERMATH
To understand the dilemmas of contemporary Fijian politics, we need to
recall the major events of the last five or six years. The immediate origins
of these dilemmas lie, of course, in the coups of 1987. It is not necessary to
revisit the contentious historiography and the conflicting interpretations
of the Fiji COUpS.l Whether their root cause was a simple racial conflict
between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians, or a power play by politi-
cians defeated at the polls is moot. What is important is that the coups'
architects attempted to erect a constitutional structure and initiate a pro-
gram of action designed to ensure the paramountcy of Fijian interests and
chiefly leadership, at the expense of the rights and privileges of other Fiji
citizens.
That task was easier to proclaim than to accomplish, because of inter-
national pressure and internal resistance. Even after Rabuka executed his
second coup on 25 September 1987, and declared Fiji a republic on 7 Octo-
ber, respite was not at hand. Beset by an economy on the verge of col-
lapse, internal social unrest, international condemnation, and the political
ineptitude of the military-dominated regime, Rabuka relinquished power
to his paramount chief and former governor-general, Ratu Sir Penaia
Ganilau, installing him as the republic's first president on 5 December
1987. Ganilau in turn invited Ratu Mara to form an interim government,
which ruled Fiji from December 1987 to May 1992.
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The Mara administration was confronted by an array of problems, two
of which required immediate attention. One was resuscitating an econ-
omy shattered by reduced investor confidence, the hemorrhaging of
skilled personnel from the public sector, the flight of capital, the interrup-
tions in the sugarcane harvest, and the severe downturn in the tourist
industry. The other was the restoration of the country to at least a sem-
blance of civilian rule through the promulgation of a constitution that
realized the publicly stated aims of the coups while maintaining the sym-
bolic paraphernalia of parliamentary democracy. To these two tasks Mara
and his ministers dedicated most of their efforts.
ECONOMIC INITIATIVES
On the economic front, the interim administration initiated policies that
promised to chart a radically different path for Fiji's economic future
(Elek and Hill 1991; Sturton and McGregor 1991). Led by Finance Minis-
ter Josevata Kamikamica, it attempted to develop commercial links with
ASEAN countries, in part to lessen traditional dependence on trade with
Australia and New Zealand, whose criticism of the coups had angered the
Fijian leaders (Sutherland 1989). This effort bore fruit as Japanese,
Korean, Malaysian, and Taiwanese companies invested in tourism, agri-
culture, and other primary production.
The government also began deregulating the economy and eliminating
Fiji's import-substitution policies. It started a tax-free zone under which
companies exporting 90 percent or more of their products would be
granted tax holidays for up to thirteen years and would be exempt from
customs duties on imported equipment and production materials (Chan-
dra 1990). By 1991, more than three hundred companies had invested a
total of F$102 million, and another one hundred were approved. 2 The tax-
free base was extended beyond the garment industry, where it had
received its initial and greatest success, to include timber processing for
furniture and fittings and manufacture of light technical equipment (PR, 25
July 1991, 3). Critics have complained about the unequal distribution of
income generated by the new industries and about sweatshop conditions
(Barr 1990), but the scheme has improved Fiji's balance of payments and
provided local employment.
These new economic programs required strict regulation of the labor
market and a corresponding reduction in the power of the trade unions,
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which were prohibited in the tax-free zones. The trade union movement
was the backbone of the Fiji Labour Party and a continuing source of irri-
tation to the government (Slatter I989). In May I99I, the government
enacted a series of repressive labor laws intended to control the trade
unions, but officially justified in the name of improving the country's
international competitiveness and internal economic flexibility. The new
decrees enabled the prosecution of trade unions for damages arising from
"unlawful" trade disputes; introduced company-based unions; amended
the Trade Disputes Act to include other forms of industrial action such as
go-slow, work-to-rule, and the withdrawal of goodwill; provided for the
use of postal or workplace ballots for the election of union officials; and
abolished minimum-wage councils. In retaliation, the Fiji Trades Union
Congress, with twenty-five trade unions and 45 percent of Fiji's full-time
workers among its members, threatened a massive strike, which was
averted when the government retracted the decrees (IB, June I99I).
The scene was also set for confrontation in the sugar industry. Dispute
there centered on two issues. One was the farmers' demand for a full fore-
cast price for cane of F$43.70 per ton, and not the F$34.96 offered by the
Fiji Sugar Corporation, a reduction it justified in the name of the falling
international price, bad weather, increased costs of production, and har-
vest delays (PR, 30 May I99I). The other was the farmers' demand for
prompt elections, postponed since I987, for the Sugar Cane Growers'
Council. When their demands were refused, the farmers threatened a
strike, whereupon the government passed decrees declaring the sugar
industry an essential service and proposed fourteen-year jail sentences and
fines up to F$I4,000 for anyone interrupting the running of the industry
(RFC, I99I). Once again the government backed down when faced with
further industrial action by the farmers. Nonetheless, the imminent con-
frontation between the two sowed the seeds of bitterness and distrust that
would resurface later in the political arena.
One beneficiary of the disputes in the sugar industry was the National
Farmers' Union, formed in the I980s, the brainchild of the trade unionist
Mahendra Chaudhary, finance minister in the short-lived Bavadra govern-
ment. The union's success helped to undermine the influence of its much
older rivals, the Kisan Sangh and the Federation of Cane Growers. When
elections were held for the Sugar Cane Growers' Council early in I992, the
National Farmers' Union won a majority of the seats. It became, in effect,
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the Fiji Labour Party's rural arm and the main reason for Labour's elec-
toral victory in the cane belts in the 1992 elections. Chaudhary, too,
gained in stature (or notoriety) (IB, June 1991). The National Farmers'
Union had enabled him to extend his power beyond his urban trade union
base, and he used his new connections to great political advantage (IB,
July 1991 ).
Another unexpected winner from the postcoup industrial tremors was
Sitiveni Rabuka, who distanced himself from the interim administration's
policies to create a niche for himself as a moderate consensus builder. In
the nurses' strike and the long-festering Vatukoula gold mine strike, for
example, he sympathized with the strikers. He went further. In June 1991,
he said that Mara's administration "had got their industrial policies wrong
and ought to resign. . . . This government is a reactionary government,"
said Rabuka, "made up of overpaid people who sit on their laurels and
wait for something to happen before they react" (FT, 8 June 1991). He even
threatened to "repossess" the power he had vested in the president. A few
days later he apologized to the government for his blistering criticism, and
for "insulting" his paramount chiefs. Even more incredibly, he joined
Mara's cabinet as deputy prime minister. One interpretation of this devel-
opment was that he had been coopted, and thus marginalized, by Mara.
Nonetheless, Rabuka had signaled his independence. This, together with
the government's confrontational industrial policies, was an important
reason why, after the 1992 elections, he was able to get Labour's support
in his bid to become prime minister.
THE CONSTITUTION
Several attempts in the immediate aftermath of the coups to produce a
broadly acceptable constitution had failed (Lal 1992b, 321). Then, in
October 1988, the interim administration appointed the Constitution
Inquiry and Advisory Committee to produce a constitution "having regard
in particular to the failure of the 1970 constitution to provide adequate
and full protection of the rights, interests and concerns of the indigenous
Fijian people, and having regard to all the circumstances prevailing in Fiji"
(FCIAC 1989). The loaded terms of reference-how was it determined that
the 1970 constitution had failed and by whom?-need little comment. The
coup leaders were described by the committee as "members of the security
• 77
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forces who assisted in the change of government in 1987." The committee
presented its report early in 1990 and a new constitution was promulgated
by the president in July of that year.
The new constitution provides for an executive presidency and a bicam-
erallegislature consisting of an appointed upper house, the Senate, and an
elected lower house, the House of Representatives. The president, always
to be a Fijian chief, is to be appointed by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga or
Great Council of Chiefs and responsible to that body alone in the exercise
of the powers of office. These are considerable, including appointing the
prime minister (again always to be a Fijian) and members of the presi-
dent's advisory council, and presiding over other important functions of
the state.
The Senate consists of 34 appointed members, 24 nominated by the
Council of Chiefs and the remaining 10 by the president. The council's
senators retain the power of veto over all legislation that impinges on
Fijian interests, including land and traditional customs. Given their
strength in the Senate, they can, if they wish, frustrate the legislative
efforts of any government, even one dominated by Fijians. In effect, the
chiefs and their nominees in the Senate enjoy untrammeled powers to con-
trol the legislative agenda.
The elected House of Representatives consists of 70 members, of whom
37 are indigenous Fijians, 27 are Indo-Fijians, and 10 are "Others." Here,
the new constitution differs from the old one, which had established par-
ity between the two major ethnic groups, now roughly equal in numbers.
In another major change, all the members are to be elected on purely
racial rolls, with Fijians voting only for Fijians, Indo-Fijians only for Indo-
Fijians, and Others (Chinese, Europeans and Part-Europeans, Pacific
Islanders) voting only for their ethnic candidates. (The 1970 constitution
provided for half the parliamentary seats to be elected from multiracial
constituencies). The racially based rolls leave little opportunity or incen-
tive for multiracial politics, and they discourage the adoption of more
broadly based political platforms that transcend racial and parochial con-
cerns. There is no practical advantage in a multiracial philosophy, as was
painfully evident in the 1992 elections.
Of the 37 Fijian seats, 32 are elected from the rural constituencies and
the remaining 5 from urban ones. The allocation of seats became an issue.
Why, argued many, should the province of Ba, for instance, with more
than 55,000 ethnic Fijians, have the same number of seats, three, as Lau
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with a population of 14,000? Why should Rewa, with 48,000 Fijians, get
two seats while Cakaudrove, with 29,000, gets three? Why indeed? And
why should urban Fijians, who make up more than one-third of the Fijian
population, have only five seats? The main reason for this gross malap-
portionment was to reduce the voting strength of the urban Fijians whose
support, however small, for the Labour Party had contributed to its 1987
victory. It is also part of the larger effort to preserve the Fijian status quo.
The constitution thus became a major issue before and during the elec-
tions. Most Fijians appeared to support it and to welcome the dominant
voice it gave them, though many from western Viti Levu questioned their
electoral underrepresentation and the rejection of their claim for a sepa-
rate confederacy, the Yasayasa Vaka Ra, to complement the existing three
(the Tovata, the Burebasaga, and the Kubuna) and give them a national
voice commensurate with their numbers and contribution to the national
economy.3 In a submission to the Constitution Inquiry and Advisory
Committee, a twelve-member delegation of western Fijians criticized the
constitution for discriminating "against the progressively productive, bet-
ter educated, forward thinking Fiji citizens of all races in favour of that
minority segment of the community that represents (and seeks to reserve
for itself) the aristocratic, undemocratic, privileged pattern of colonial
life" (Sutherland 1992, 190). Their protests went unheeded, but were
voiced again in the elections. The Coalition (of the National Federation
Party and the Fiji Labour Party) rejected the constitution too, denouncing
it as racist, feudalistic, undemocratic, and authoritarian, and promised an
international campaign to overthrow it. The difference of opinion within
the coalition on how best to achieve this goal led to its collapse.
PREPARING FOR THE ELECTIONS
Conflict in the Fijian Camp
With the constitution formally promulgated in July 1990, the Council of
Chiefs launched a new political party that it hoped would unite the Fijian
people under one umbrella, in the manner of the Fijian Administration of
colonial days. Thus united, the chiefs hoped, the Soqosoqo ni Vakavu-
lewa ni Taukei (SVT, or Fijian Political Party) would lead the Fijian people
to electoral victory and fulfil the aims of the coup. The reality turned out
to be different. Even as the party was being launched, some Fijian leaders
questioned the wisdom of the Council of Chiefs, as a formal nonpolitical
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body, sponsoring a political party. One critic was Apisai Tora, who
wanted the chiefs to remain above the fray of ordinary politicking. What
would happen to the dignity of the council if it failed to capture all the
Fijian seats? "Our firm view," he said, "remains that the Bose Levu Vaka-
turaga should be at the pinnacle of Fijian society, totally removed from the
taint of ordinary politicking" (FT, 10 Oct 1991)
Such views went unheeded, paving the way for further problems. The
first of these emerged over the election of the president of the Fijian Politi-
cal Party. Many Fijians wanted a nonpolitical chief, chosen through con-
sensus, to lead the party and provide it with a semblance of impartial tra-
ditional authority. Once again, the reality turned out to be different.
There were three contenders for the presidency: Ratu William
Toganivalu, a high chief of Bau; Lady Lala Mara, the paramount chief of
Burebasaga and Ratu Mara's wife; and Sitiveni Rabuka. To the surprise of
many and the consternation of others, Rabuka defeated the chiefs, win-
ning 9 of the 19 ballots of the Management Committee of the Fijian Politi-
cal Party, while Lala Mara got 6 votes and Toganivalu 4. 4 This stunning
result intrigued many Fijians, including the Fijian Nationalist Party leader
Sakiasi Butadroka, who remai'ked: "If the SVT delegates can put a com-
moner before a chief, then I don't understand why the Great Council of
Chiefs is backing the SVT•.•. I don't know why a chiefs-backed party
can do such a thing," he said, "putting a chief-in this case the highest
ranking chief, Ro Lady Lala-before a selection panel" (FT, 4 Nov 1991).
Rabuka's ascendancy troubled many Fijians, including some of his for-
mer (but now disenchanted) supporters, who had expected him to fade
away after the coup. Among the reasons for their disenchantment were his
mercurial character and bursts of sharp criticism of Mara's administra-
tion. His aggressive pursuit of political power disturbed them, as Rabuka
made no secret of his ambition to become prime minister. He demanded
complete loyalty from his colleagues and saw his election to the presidency
of the Fijian Political Party as bringing him a step closer to the top job (FT,
I Nov 1991). Other aspirants disagreed, citing the constitutional provision
that the appointment of prime minister was the prerogative of the presi-
dent, to be exercised in independent deliberate judgment.
As he maneuvered for the prime ministership, Rabuka began to develop
ideological justifications for his ambitions. Although still proclaiming
himself a loyal commoner, he wondered whether it was appropriate for
chiefs to involve themselves in the cut and thrust of electoral politics.
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Their proper role was at the local village level, because "when it comes to
politics, the chiefs do not have the mandate of the people" (Age, 17 Aug
1991). To underscore his point, he stressed that "there are a lot of capable
commoners who can playa very, very important role in the Fiji of the next
decade" (IB, July 1991, 25). Implicitly, he counted himself among them.
He also noted that "the dominance of customary chiefs in government is
coming to an end" and soon "aristocracy" would be replaced by "meritoc-
racy" (FT, 29 Aug 1991). None too subtly, he was invoking the "Melane-
sian" model of achieved leadership against the "Polynesian" model of
ascribed leadership. He compared his paramount chiefs-he had Mara in
mind-to the towering banyan tree "where you don't see anything grow-
ing," and suggested that they should step aside (PIM, Aug 1991). No one
was indispensable, he said. "Those defeated in elections should take it in
their political stride, accept defeat and move out gracefully" (FT, 1 Nov
1991).
Ratu Mara, the target of Rabuka's barb, was among those disturbed by
Rabuka's strident ascendancy. He thought Rabuka an "angry young
man," a naive soldier, erratic, "speaking off the cuff in any instigation,"
and implicitly unworthy to be his successor (MT, Nov 1991). The Fijian
Political Party under Rabuka's leadership was a "debacle," "an organiza-
tion in disarray," Mara reportedly told his political intimates (WPR, Mar
1992, 5). Rabuka retaliated, calling Mara a "ruthless politician who has
been allowed to get away with a lot. Maybe it's because of the Fijian cul-
ture that he is a big chief and because he was groomed well by the colonial
government" (DP, II Dec 1991). Early in 1992, Mara encouraged the for-
mation of an informal "Diners' Club" in which he shared his experiences
with a select number of prominent and aspiring Fijian leaders. Rabuka
was not among them. Mara went further and backed Josefata Kami-
kamica as his preferred successor. The rupture between Mara and Rabuka
was complete, yet they are more alike in autocratic temperament and well-
developed sense of personal destiny than they care to acknowledge.
Tensions within the Fijian Political Party erupted openly with the selec-
tion of candidates for the 1992 elections. In province after province
aspiring candidates questioned the selection procedures, threatened to
stand as independents, and sometimes formed their own parties even as
they pledged their loyalty to the chiefs. In Macuata, the situation had so
deteriorated that it required the president's personal intervention. Here,
first ballot choices had to be discarded to accommodate rebellious would-
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be independents. One of the stranger ironies of the selection process was
that some of the most ardent supporters of the coup missed out alto-
gether. 5 Many of them became bitter critics of Rabuka.
Rabuka also had to contend with new Fijian political parties that chal-
lenged the authority and legitimacy of the Fijian Political Party. There was
Sakiasi Butadroka's Fijian Nationalist Party, in 1991 revamped and
renamed the Fijian Christian Nationalist Party. Characteristically anti-
Indian, Butadroka also called for more balanced development in the Fiji
provinces; decentralization of the Ministry of Fijian Affairs; reversion of
all fee-simple and Crown lands to their native owners; complete Fijian
ownership of all rents from the exploitation of mineral and natural
resources; reactivation of traditional, rural administrative structures; sup-
port for a fourth confederacy and the rotation of the presidency among
all of them; and an all-Fijian parliament within ten years, in recognition
of the Fijian people's "full authority and absolute power."6 In April
1992, Butadroka joined forces with Ratu Osea Gavidi's newly formed,
Nadroga-based, Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua (STV, Party of the People of
the Land), which was essentially a revival of the long-dormant Western
United Front.
This coalition's rival for support among Fijians outside the Fijian Politi-
cal Party generally (and in western Viti Levu in particular), was Apisai
Tora's All Nationals Congress launched on 22 June 1991. Tora, the cigar-
chomping, once self-styled Fidel Castro of the Pacific, militant trade
unionist of the 1960s turned ethnic chauvinist of the 1980s, is the quintes-
sential survivor of Fiji politics. Once a leader of the Indian-based National
Federation Party, he joined the Alliance Party in the late 1970S and was
rewarded with a cabinet portfolio. After the Labour Coalition's victory in
1987, he helped found the Taukei Movement, and was a member of the
various postcoup cabinets until forced out by Mara when he, Tora,
founded the All Nationals Congress.
This party presented itself as a moderate, multiracial successor to the
defunct Alliance Party, which had ruled Fiji for nearly two decades. 7 It
committed itself to rethinking the interim administration's social, eco-
nomic, and industrial policies, promoting regional development to favor
economically depressed provinces, reviewing such statutory organizations
as the Native Lands Trust Board and, most importantly, the constitution.
The anti-eastern Fijian sentiment was there, too, as Tora made "no secret
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of his desire to end the political dominance of eastern Fijians, as repre-
sented by Ratu Mara and Ganilau" (IB, Oct 1991, 37). Tora remained a
steadfast advocate of the fourth confederacy, and presented himself as a
progressive, an agent of change (PIM, July 1991). Tora, Butadroka, and
leaders of a few ephemeral parties that disappeared just as soon as they
were launched came from different ideological backgrounds and had
diverse political agendas. What they all shared was an unmistakable hos-
tility toward the hegemony of eastern Fijians and toward the Fijian Politi-
cal Party, which they saw as Mara's instrument.
On the eve of the election the Fijians seemed less united than ever
before. Rabuka's leadership of the Fijian Political Party and his prime
ministerial aspirations were contested. Triumphant postcoup Fijian na-
tionalism was in danger of derailment. The removal of the perceived
threat of Indian dominance that had distorted political discourse in Fiji for
so long had allowed further discussion of internal Fijian issues that had
long remained hidden from the non-Fijian public. As one Fiji Times edito-
rial put it, "The Fijians are now facing so many issues that challenge the
very fabric of traditional and customary life. Things they thought were
sacred have become political topics, publicly debated, scrutinised and ridi-
culed." Now, the editorial continued, "the threat is coming from within
their own communities where the politics of numbers are changing loyal-
ties and alliances. For the first time in modern history, the Fijian com-
munity is in danger of fragmentation; democracy is taking its toll. The
chiefs are losing their mana and politicians enjoy increasing influence"
(FT, 21 Mar 1992).
Coalition in Disarray
Fortunately for Rabuka and others in the Fijian camp, things were little
better on the Coalition side, where internal divisions and differences over
strategy proved even more irreconcilable and destructive. The coalition
between the National Federation Party and the Fiji Labour Party had
fallen on hard times. It had become a moribund marriage of convenience
marooned in the shallows. Its unity, evident following the coups, had
become embroiled in personal leadership ambitions, following the death
of Timoci Bavadra in 1989, and in deep differences over strategy. The
Coalition had denounced the new constitution vehemently, but the part-
ners disagreed over how best to work for its repeal. Should they partici-
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pate in the elections and initiate a dialogue with the new government in
parliament, or should they boycott the elections and rely on international
pressure to effect the necessary changes?
The National Federation Party, led by its former parliamentary leader
Jai Ram Reddy, decided in late July 1991 against the boycott option,
choosing to participate in the elections under protest. Several consider-
ations informed this decision. The party leaders realized that international
pressure, in which the Fiji Labour Party placed much store, would be to
no avail, and that in the end the Indo-Fijian leaders would have to deal
with the elected representatives of the Fijian people. Only if the Fijian
leaders rejected dialogue and refused to consider issues of concern to them
would the National Federation Party use the boycott weapon. Participa-
tion in the election did not mean acceptance of the constitution. "If you
get elected and do nothing, then you are accepting it," said Reddy. "If at
every single opportunity, you raise your voice, and if need be, walk out of
the House: that is not accepting the constitution" (FT, 21 Aug 1991).
The NFP leaders also realized that boycott would fail as many Indo-
Fijians would stand for election anyway, and present themselves as leaders
of their people. Indeed, small anti-Coalition, pro-election Indo-Fijian
political parties had already begun to emerge, among them the Fiji Indian
Congress and the Fiji Indian Liberal Party. Participation under protest was
consistent with the National Federation Party's past history. In 1965, for
instance, it had been unhappy with the outcome of the London constitu-
tional conference, which favored Europeans and Fijians, but had worked
under the new constitution for two years before staging a boycott in 1967
and precipitating a by-election a year later (Lal 1992b, 200-204). The NFP
leaders also heeded the advice of leaders overseas that the boycott option
should be the last resort (VP, 19 May 1992). As for the FLP leaders, Reddy
said: "They are by nature negative and their language is boycott, strike,
disrupt, destroy and wreck. They want to destroy everything in sight" (vP,
II May 1992).
The Fiji Labour Party disagreed. How could it participate in an election
under a constitution it had roundly condemned as racist, authoritarian,
undemocratic, and feudalistic? To do so would accord legitimacy to that
flawed document and undermine the party's credibility internationally.
The Fiji Labour Party told visiting Australian Foreign Minister Gareth
Evans in February 1992: "We do not wish to be a party to an election that
will not return Fiji to genuine democracy but instead entrench an authori-
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tarian racist government similar to that of South Africa" (FLP, 4 Feb 1992).
International pressure, the party believed, would force the government
into a dialogue on the constitution. Said Navin Maharaj, its secretary gen-
eral, "Nothing can be done by going into parliament and success can only
come through international pressure, and that is what we intend to do"
(DP, 27 April 1992). "Rabuka has explicitly told us that the Constitution
cannot be changed and likewise the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei
has not given any assurance of any change," said Mahendra Chaudhary.
"Do you think the coup-plotters carried out so much atrocities for the last
five years just to change the constitution?" (DP, II May 1992).
That was the Fiji Labour Party's public stance. In private, however, it
was pursuing other options. While it would formally maintain its boycott
stance, the party encouraged its indigenous Fijian members to forge a
broad coalition with parties outside the Fijian Political Party, including
the Fijian Nationalist Party and the All Nationals Congress, and even to
contest election as independents. Such a move was, in fact, made in Octo-
ber 1991, and a thirty-eight-point joint platform prepared. Among other
items, it included the promotion of indigenous Fijian aspirations in
accordance with international conventions; the creation of a fourth Fijian
confederacy; the introduction of a national leadership code of conduct;
the preservation "of the dignity and integrity and independence of the
Bose Levu Vakaturaga so that it is not manipulated to support the type of
politics that diminishes people's respect for the chiefs"; condemnation of
the antiurban bias of the constitution; and an urgent review of the consti-
tution to make it "consistent with democratic principles, United Nations
human rights conventions and Commonwealth statements of principles
and thus enable Fiji to apply for membership of the commonwealth as
soon as possible."8
At first the prospects looked promising, but they fell apart when Buta-
droka had second thoughts about what the proposals would do to his own
credibility. "If there is any work done with the FLP, our image as a deeply
rooted Fijian party will be tarnished," he said. "Either you come in as
independent candidates on our party ticket or we stand as adversaries
in the election." Koresi Matatolu, the All Nationals Congress general sec-
retary, laid down other preconditions. His party would join, he said,
if Butadroka retracted his call to deport Indians from Fiji and if the
Fiji Labour Party recognized the constitution. Talk of solidarity remained
just talk.
....
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The FLP leaders had also been seeking to merge the Fiji Labour Party
and the National Federation Party into a single party (FT, 18 Aug 1991).
Labour reminded the National Federation Party of its apparent commit-
ment to a merger in the late 1980s, which the party disavowed. It rejected
the merger option, too, in the interest of political survival. The coalition
. arrangement had worked well, said Reddy, and should continue. "We can
speak out without treading on each other's toes. In a merged party, I
would be very unhappy if the party agreed to nationalisation. Then, we
would project an image of division." He went further: "I am more and
more intrigued, as time progresses, about the real motive behind this
move. Is it unity or is it because the NFP has become too much of a nui-
sance for the Labour Party?" (FT, 21 Aug 1991).
Reddy and other NFP leaders were not the only ones opposed to the
merger. Vocal opposition came also from some leading Fijian members of
the Fiji Labour Party, among them Simione Durutalo, its founding vice
president. He called the merger proposal a strategic mistake that would
"lock everybody back into pre-1987 voting patterns with people voting on
racial lines rather than for parties," by once again raising the specter of
Indo-Fijian domination (FT, 16 Aug 1991). He went on that it would be far
better for the Fiji Labour Party to prepare its groundwork and position
itself for victory in the 1996 elections than attempt to win through a
merger in 1992: "Then, if the military comes in, we will have the people's
support." The only way forward in Fiji politics, he said, was to "demo-
cratise Fijian society." "The Fiji Labour Party is the only political party
able to create an inter-ethnic alliance that can simultaneously champion
the Indo-Fijian interests for long-term political security as well as indige-
nous Fijian commoners' interests and aspirations for long-term economic
security" (FT, 16 Aug 1991). Durutalo and others became disenchanted
with the Fiji Labour Party when its leaders ignored their advice and
refused to reconsider the party's boycott strategy. On the eve of the elec-
tions, some of them left the party or began to forge links with other Fijian
parties.
In a last, almost desperate, attempt to maintain a fa~ade of unity and to
prevent a splitting of the Indo-Fijian community, the Fiji Labour Party
offered not to disrupt the National Federation Party's election plans if it
obtained the government's assurance to immediately address all issues of
concern to the Coalition (foremost among them a review of the constitu-
tion). Without such assurance, the National Federation Party would boy-
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cott parliament. But if the government agreed to its demands, it would
enter parliament and participate in deliberations "only to the extent of giv-
ing effect to redressing those grievances." Furthermore, the National Fed-
eration Party would "consult with and obtain the agreement of FLP at all
stages of the negotiation" (FLP, 30 Apr 1992).
It was a fantastic demand, which the National Federation Party could
not accept "without sacrificing for all time NFP'S reputation and integrity."
One NFP leader likened the ultimatum to the extortionate demands of a
tyrannical landlord. Perhaps the Fiji Labour Party did not really expect
the National Federation Party to accept its conditions. Perhaps it wanted
to use rejection as an excuse to participate in the elections, for by early
1992 the boycott option had become untenable and was being severely
criticized throughout Fiji. Even its respected international advisers were of
that mind. Among them was Professor Yash Ghai, who wrote:
It is possible to attack a Constitution and yet take part in the elections. But it is
absolutely essential that the terms on which it [the party] takes part is made
clear so that it [taking part] is not interpreted as an endorsement of the consti-
tution. A party may wish to take part in the elections with a view to changing
the constitution, or making the political system under it difficult to operate, or
not letting its rivals dominate parliament and government. So while there may
be a strong moral case for a boycott, it may occasionally make sense to take
part in elections while simultaneously attacking the constitution. The really
important question was not to boycott, but whether to endorse the constitu-
tion. (FT, 7 May 1992)
Unable to coerce the National Federation Party into acquiescence, with
its own house in disarray, public opinion heavily in favor of participating
in the elections, and facing marginalization because of the NFP'S election
decision, the Fiji Labour Party acknowledged the inevitable and late in
April announced its decision to participate. By any measure, this was a
stunning volte face. How did the Fiji Labour Party explain its new posi-
tion? Said Navin Maharaj: "It was only a change in strategy: from boycott
of the election to boycott of parliament." Why? "The change came about
because the NFP has no clear picture" (DP, II May 1992). Its flip-flop left
its supporters dismayed and uncertain. Amid acrimony and vacillation,
the coalition had collapsed.
The one major political party that was not as consumed by bitter inter-
nal divisions as the Fijian Political Party or the FLP-NFP Coalition was the
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General Voters Party (GVP). It was in some ways a resurrection of the pre-
coup General Electors Association, which was a small but influential
spoke in the Alliance Party wheel. The only difference now was that the
General electorate had been widened to include not only Part-Europeans,
Chinese, and people of mixed ancestry, but also other Fiji citizens of
Pacific Islands ancestry who, prior to the coup, were registered on the
Fijian roll (Solomon Islanders, Samoans, Tongans). Like the other ethni-
cally based parties, the General Voters Party's concerns were parochial,
focusing on the interests and aspirations of its own community. It pro-
claimed itself in favor of "a system of democracy which incorporates the
principle of guaranteed representation of major ethnic groups" in parlia-
ment, and opposed to "any attempt to weaken or remove a legally-estab-
lished right to the existing ownership of land, whether native or
freehold."9 Large portions of freehold land in Fiji are owned by Europe-
ans, and the five General Voters Party seats in parliament are grossly out
of proportion to their numbers.
THE CAMPAIGN
The campaign itself was much more subdued than all the previous ones.
The interim administration's decree making libel a criminal offense pun-
ishable by up to two years imprisonment and a F$1300 fine, together with
the memory of the harassment of journalists since the coups, deterred the
media from searching scrutiny of the election platforms and personalities.
The racially segregated electoral system encouraged candidates to confine
themselves to issues of particular concern to their ethnic communities or,
in the case of the Fijians, their provinces and regions. National, nonracial
issues were present in the election platforms and in the campaign rhetoric,
but were not given serious consideration.
Reddy of the National Federation Party, for example, talked of a gov-
ernment of national unity "based on a formula of power-sharing which
would ensure that every community is represented at the decision making
level" (DP, 9 May 1992), but his proposal was ridiculed by the Labour
Party, which said that such an arrangement would "both implicitly and
explicitly give credence and legitimacy to the decreed constitution," and
reduce the National Federation Party to a "subservient position ...
depending on the mercy of the Fijian side in parliament" (FLP, II May
1992). Ratu Mara and Ratu William Toganivalu attempted to distance
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themselves from the constitution they had generated, much to the annoy-
ance of Rabuka and his allies. But for the most part such issues remained
in the background. Instead, internal fighting in both camps dominated the
news on the hustings.
In the Fijian Political Party, the main question centered on who would
be prime minister, Sitiveni Rabuka or Josevata Kamikamica. Sometimes
the campaigns on behalf of the two men became unpleasant, even vicious.
As was his wont, Rabuka changed his tune often, depending on his audi-
ence. To the fundamentalist members of the Methodist Church, he
renewed his call to declare Fiji a Christian state and reimpose the Sabbath
decree; from his militant nationalist supporters, he demanded complete
loyalty and promised action, if needed, "in order to complete what they
started"; to the media and to his opponents, he was the very essence of
good sense and moderation, talking of national reconciliation and dia-
logue. (What happened to the Pacific way? he asked-without irony, so
far as one could tell [TR, May 1992]). For his part, Kamikamica, who was
outwardly confident of his chances, highlighted his administrative experi-
ence, distanced himself from the extreme rhetoric of his more nationalist-
minded compatriots, and promised to work toward genuine multi-
racialism.
In the former Coalition camp, the exchanges were equally pointed and
unpleasant as leaders exhumed and ridiculed each other's record of public
service since the coups and personal commitments to Fiji-many of them
have visas for permanent residence overseas-and traded insults, accusing
each other of opportunism, arrogance, and treachery. The vehemence of
the attacks was especially surprising in view of the virtually identical plat-
forms of the two political parties. The republic's first election campaign
produced more heat than light, as the confused electorate pondered their
limited choices.
Polling lasted a week, from 23 May to 30 June. In the Fijian constituen-
cies, the Fijian Political Party won 30 of the 37 Fijian seats, the Fijian
Nationalist Party 3, the Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua 2, and independents
2. The Fijian Political Party won 66.6 percent of all the Fijian votes cast
(112,447), the Fijian Nationalist Party 12.8 percent, the All Nationals Con-
gress 8.7 percent, the Fiji Labour Party 1.2 percent, the Soqosoqo ni
Taukei ni Vanua 4.6 percent, and the independents 6.2 percent. The Fijian
voter turnout averaged 78 percent. A further breakdown of these figures
reveals noteworthy trends. The Fijian Political Party achieved its greatest
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triumph in the small eastern constituencies of the Koro Sea, getting 89.I
percent of all votes cast (27,658). Its better organization there, and the
undivided support of the provincial councils, accounted for its spectacular
success. In the urban constituencies, too, the party did relatively well, cap-
turing 74.7 percent of all the rural votes (32,252). Again a more effective
campaign organization and an attractive slate of candidates helped this
party.
In the rural constituencies generally, however, the Fijian Political Party
did less well, winning only 63.3 percent of all the rural votes (8o,I95). In
rural Viti Levu, it won only 49.7 percent of the total Fijian votes (52,538),
the main reason for its modest showing there being the challenge of the
other Fijian parties, especially the Fijian Nationalist Party and the Soqo-
soqo ni Taukei ni Vanua, which together won 26.5 percent of all the Fijian
votes. Butadroka, the Fijian Nationalist Party leader, was a known per-
sonality and a charismatic campaigner. His grassroots style of campaign-
ing, and his uncomplicated political message laced with earthy humor,
won him support, as it had done in previous elections. His running mate,
Ratu Mosese Tuisawau, was a high chief of the Rewa province, who
appealed powerfully to the Rewans' sense of pride and demanded a
greater Rewan voice in national Fijian affairs. One of the Fijian National-
ist Party's proposals was the rotation of the presidency among the four
confederacies, with Rewa next in line. Ratu Osea Gavidi and his running
mate, Mosese Tuisawau, campaigning under the banner of the Fijian
Nationalist Party and the Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua, won the 2
Nadroga/Navosa seats, again by focusing on local issues.
The other major party that had threatened to erode support for the
Fijian Political Party in Viti Levu was the All Nationals Congress. It did
not win any seats, but only narrowly missed out in Ba where it managed
to capture 5775 votes; it gained 8384 votes in rural Viti Levu as a whole
(IO.5 percent of the Fijian votes cast). Why did the All Nationals Congress
fail? Tora's own chequered political career was a factor, as was the fear
among many Fijians that anything short of a clear victory for the Fijian
Political Party could see Fiji facing another round of political upheaval (as
Rabuka seemed to hint in his speeches).
Labour's dismal performance in the Fijian constituencies was not sur-
prising. It was underfunded, underprepared, and entered late into the
fray, putting up disenchanted candidates, who were merely expected to
keep the party flag flying, in only a handful of constituencies. Disunity
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among its leaders did not help matters, nor did public criticism of the
party's election strategy by some of its leading Fijian members, such as
Simione Durutalo. Many Fijians who had joined the party in 1987 had
left, including such luminaries as Joeli Kalou and Jo Nacola, both minis-
ters in the Bavadra government, the former contesting the election on the
Fijian Political Party ticket and the latter as an independent. On the eve of
the election, Labour had come to be regarded among many Fijians as an
Indo-Fijian party.
Among the Indo-Fijians, where the voter turnout was 76.7 percent, the
results confounded all predictions. The National Federation Party, which
had been widely expected to win nearly all the 27 Indo-Fijian seats, won
only 14, the remaining 13 going to the Fiji Labour Party. Minor Indo-
Fijian parties failed to make any mark. The National Federation Party
won 50 percent of the total Indo-Fijian votes cast (114,005) and the Fiji
Labour Party 47.6 percent. A breakdown of the figures shows important
trends. Labour won most of the seats in the cane belts of Fiji, whereas the
National Federation Party, founded as a cane farmers party in the early
1960s, achieved its greatest success in the urban areas, which should have
been Labour's domain.
Labour's victory in the cane belt benefited from the success in the Sugar
Cane Growers Council of the National Farmers' Union, whose real leader,
Mahendra Chaudhary, also led the Fiji Labor Party. In the countryside,
Labour and the Farmers' Union were seen as one and the same. The
National Federation Party had let the Fiji Labour Party claim public credit
for the Coalition's role in resolving the dispute in the sugar industry,
which Labour was now portraying as its own, rather than a joint, achieve-
ment. The National Federation Party was not helped by being portrayed
as a party of the Indo-Fijian bourgeoisie. In urban areas, it was better
funded, fielded better candidates, and was able to benefit from bitter divi-
sions within the ranks of the trade unions. Some of Chaudhary's harshest
critics, such as trade union leader James Raman, were NFP candidates.
Labour's victory was as unexpected as it was sweet. Its sharper message,
better organization, strong support among Indo-Fijian voters for whom
the National Federation Party's earlier anticolonial struggles were a vague
memory, had worked to Labour's advantage, ensuring its important role
in the Indo-Fijian community for some time to come. The National Feder-
ation Party, on the other hand, is, and sees itself as, essentially a commu-
nal party, but the interests of Indo-Fijians are not as homogeneous as they
".NiMM_AMIM
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once appeared to be. Its message is blurred, and its viability as a credible
force is unclear.
THE RACE FOR PRIME MINISTER
The race for prime minister started even before results were known, as
leading candidates Rabuka and Kamikamica began to campaign for sup-
port among the opposition parties. The exact details and sequence of
events in the hectic few days following the elections will probably never be
fully revealed, but the basic outline is clear. As soon as the final results
were announced, the parliamentary board of the Fijian Political Party
met, on 31 May, to elect its leader, who would be its candidate for prime
minister. At this meeting, Rabuka repeatedly won 18 votes, Kamikamica
2, Filipe Bole 4, and Ratu William Toganivalu 3. With his party's man-
date, and with the Fijian Political Party lacking an outright majority to
form a government, Rabuka began to explore a coalition with the General
Voters Party (which had won all the five General seats), the Fijian Nation-
alist Party, the Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua, and the two independents.
Again the details are unclear, though we do know from press statements
that the General Voters Party opposed any coalition that included the
Fijian Nationalist Party, whose extremist platforms it had denounced dur-
ing the campaign. The General Voters Party preferred Kamikamica for the
top job.
When Rabuka went to Government House on I June to be sworn in,
claiming the support of forty-two members of the House behind him,
President Ganilau told him to produce the signatures of all those who sup-
ported him before 10 AM the next day. The president, thought to be lean-
ing in Kamikamica's direction, was aware of the split in the Fijian Political
Party over the leadership and was mindful of Mara's preference. Equally,
he was mindful of the constitutional requirement to appoint as prime min-
ister the Fijian best able to command the majority support of all members
in the House of Representatives, including the twenty-seven Indo-Fijian
members.
Obtaining the signatures was not as easy as Rabuka might have sup-
posed, for by the time he returned from Government House, new tensions
had arisen. Some Fijian members who had supported him initially
opposed any formal association with the Fijian Nationalist Party and
threatened to throw their weight behind his opponent. The situation was
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also complicated by the National Federation Party's public support for
Kamikamica. Reddy had told Rabuka's emissaries that he could not sup-
port the major general, whom he did not and could not trust. He consid-
ered Kamikamica a safer bet who had verbally assured the National Fed-
eration Party of his willingness to initiate immediate discussion on the
constitution. By late the same evening, Rabuka's fortunes were uncertain,
for by then, according to some sources, Kamikamica had secured the sup-
port of 30 parliamentarians (10 Fijian Political Party members, I Rotu-
man, 5 of the General Voters Party, and 14 from the National Federation
Party), while Rabuka was supported by 20 from the Fijian Political Party,
5 Nationalists, and I Independent. 10 Faced with this crisis, Rabuka's emis-
saries contacted the Fiji Labour Party in the early hours of 2 June. Soon
afterward that party wrote to Rabuka. Their historic letter is reproduced
here.
2 June 1992
(CONFIDENTIAL)
Major General Sitiveni Rabuka
(Hand Delivered)
Dear Major General Sitiveni Rabuka
The Fiji Labour Party has agreed to lend support to you for the position of
Prime Minister on the basis that our party would be given firm assurance on
the following issues in writing:
A. CONSTITUTION
The new government would immediately initiate a process of review and
change of the 1990 Constitution by a jointly appointed team that would take
into regard the objections that have been expressed by the Fiji Labour Party on
behalf of the Indian community, urban Fijians and Western Fijians, and take
immediate measures to address such objections.
Such a process to be initiated as soon as parliament convenes.
B. LABOUR REFORM DECREES
That the new government would urgently seek to have the labour decrees
revoked to take account of the objections by the trade union movement in Fiji.
C: VAT [value-added tax]
That the new government would urgently scrap VAT as a matter of priority.
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D: LAND
That the new government would convene a machinery to facilitate discussions
on the issue of land, particularly relating to the extension of ALTA [Agricultural
Landlord and Tenants Act]
That as soon as the parliament convenes, such a machinery be deliberated
upon.
The Fiji Labour Party is awaiting your urgent and serious consideration of our
request.
Yours Sincerely
Jokapeci Koroi (Mrs)
(President)
Rabuka replied immediately:
Mrs Jokapeci Koroi
President
Fiji Labour Party
Suva.
Dear Mrs Koroi,
I acknowledge the proposals outlined in your letter (2 June 1992) delivered this
mormng.
I have considered your proposals favourably and agree to take action on all the
issues, namely the constitution, VAT, labour reforms and land tenure on the
basis suggested in your letter.
I agree to hold discussions on the above issue in order to finalise the machinery
to progress the matter further.
Yours Faithfully
S. L. Rabuka
Major General
President.
Significantly, the Fiji Labour Party also obtained an undertaking from
the Fijian Nationalist Party and the Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua, which,
according to some sources, had been instrumental in initiating the dia-
logue between Rabuka and Labour. These two parties' five parliamentari-
ans (Butadroka, Gavidi, Lepani Tonitonivanua, Ratu Mosese Varasikete
Tuisawau, and Mosese Tuisawau), and the nationalist-minded indepen-
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dent, Kolonio Qiqiwaqa, wrote to the Labour Party: "We give our assur-
ance that should the President accept his nomination we will support your
conditions as set out by the new Prime Minister."
This stunning development left many in Fiji and outside gasping and
shaking their heads in confusion. Labour supporting Rabuka? and the
Nationalists agreeing with Labour's demands, among them the review of
the constitution? Rabuka's courting of Labour's (or anyone else's) support
is simply explained: he desperately needed the numbers Labour could
deliver. Labour supported Rabuka, said Mahendra Chaudhary, probably
more for public consumption than out of genuine conviction, because
Rabuka was "a changed man," who had admitted being used "by certain
chiefs" for their own purposes (PT, 2 June 1992). Moreover, Rabuka had
been an ally in the resolution of the industrial disputes, whereas Kami-
kamica's policies had precipitated them. Some Labour leaders saw Kami-
kamica as a Mara "puppet," and nothing was less acceptable to them than
Mara's continuing influence, however indirect or slight that influence
might be. Politics played its part too. By supporting Rabuka, and hence
the next government, the Labour strategists hoped to deal a death blow to
the National Federation Party.
Some Labour leaders thought themselves the real winners in the 1992
elections. The party that had been given little chance of electoral success
had managed to insert itself centrally into the national political process.
Labour, they thought, would be the tail wagging the dog, or, as one of
them said to me, while they could not be kings, they would be king-mak-
ers. Such euphoric thinking was short-lived, for once installed, Rabuka
went back to his old ways, changing his mind or denying the substance of
the deals he had made. He refused to review the value-added tax, as he
had promised, and he dismissed any urgency to review the constitution.
Three months after the election, he said he wanted a constitution "that's
totally Fijian-oriented," and expressed sympathy for the Fijian Nationalist
Party's wish to repatriate the Indo-Fijians to India (CT, I Oct 1992). In
December, he mooted the idea of a government of national unity, with
what seriousness and commitment remains to be seen. With his own sup-
port base to safeguard, and his public support among ordinary nationalist
Fijians high, Rabuka is in no hurry to keep his promises. Promises, his
utterances implied, were made to be broken.
Rabuka sits on the horns of a dilemma. Nationalist-minded Fijians will
remind him of his oft-repeated promise to fulfil his stated goals of the
coup, while Labour and others will remind him of his promises to them to
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lead Fiji toward a more just society. Then there are people within his own
party, with different allegiances and with personal ambitions, who regard
him as an unwelcome intruder, an illegitimate usurper of their own power.
Clearly, Rabuka is in an unenviable position. Leading the Fijian ship of
state through turbulent, uncharted waters will require vision, skill, tact,
and patience.
Rabuka, however, is not the only one who faces a dilemma. The Fijian
people themselves are caught between the competing demands of two
worlds, neither of which they can easily escape. On the one hand is the
call to retreat from the modern world, seek succor in traditional custom,
and entrust power "to a few well-meaning and knowledgeable people"
because "majority rule can turn into the rule of prejudice and the power of
the many to violate the rights of the few" (Ravuvu 1990, x). On the other
hand is the call by the Fijian Political Party, sponsored by the chiefs, to
promote "a more rapid movement from subsistence activities to commer-
cial enterprises and paid employment, ... to encourage greater economic
freedom and competition and allow world market forces to determine
prices and production for export and local markets through an efficient
and private enterprise sector" (SVT 1990). There is a contradiction here
that the elections, caught in the politics of race and regionalism, failed to
address; it cannot be ignored, or will be ignored at the peril of the peoples
of Fiji. It is easier to beat up one's opponents than to beat time. Paraphras-
ing T. S. Eliot, Fiji's political journey ahead is full of human vanities and
whispering ambitions, cunning passages and contrived corridors.
::- ::. ::-
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Notes
I For some easily accessible surveys and commentaries on the coup literature
see Lal and Peacock 1990; Macdonald 1990; and Firth 1989. For the social effects
of the coups see Garrett 1990.
2 In May 1992 F$r.OO was equal to US$'L47.
3 The Burebasaga confederacy consists of Rewa, Serua, Namosi, Kadavu,
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Nadroga, Navosa, and parts of Ba and the Yasawas; the Kubuna consists of Ra,
Lomaiviti, Naitasiri, and parts of Ba and the Yasawas; the Tovata consists of Lau,
Cakaudrove, Bua, and Macuata; and the proposed Yasayasa Vaka Ra would
comprise Ba, the Yasawas, Nadroga, and parts of Navosa, Ra, Serua, and
Namosi (see Lal 1922b, 324).
4 The 19 votes were distributed as follows: I each from the 14 rural constitu-
tencies and 5 representing the 5 urban seats.
5 These included Adi Finau Tabakaucoro, Inoke Tabua, Tomasi Vakatora,
Joape Rokosoi, and Taniela Veitata.
6 From his manifesto, a copy of which is in my possession.
7 From the party's manifesto and election material in my possession.
8 A copy of this document is in my possession. The quotes in the following
paragraphs are from the same document.
9 From the General Voters Party's election manifesto in my possession.
10 Much of this, and the letters reproduced, come from the proceedings of the
7th Annual Convention of the Fiji Labour Party, 14-15 August 1992.
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Abstract
Fiji went to the polls in late May 1992, five years after the coups of 1987, and two
years after the promulgation of a new constitution that entrenches indigenous
Fijian supremacy in the political process. The elections were a welcome small step
toward the restoration of a semblance of parliamentary democracy in Fiji. They
also produced a result that confounded conventional wisdom. Sitiveni Rabuka
became prime minister with the support of the Fiji Labour Party he had ousted
from power in 1987. The National Federation Party-Fiji Labour Party Coalition
disintegrated on the eve of the elections, with the two parties engaging in a bitter
contest for votes in the Indo-Fijian community. Fragmentation was also the trend
in the Fijian community. These developments and the politics behind them are
considered in detail within a framework that looks retrospectively at the major
political and economic developments since the coups. The issues examined
include the interim administration's economic policies, which unwittingly helped
forge alliances across ethnic and ideological divides; the controversy over the
1990 constitution and its rejection by the opposition Indo-Fijian parties; the emer-
gence of new political parties and conflicts in the Fijian camp; the disarray in the
Coalition over whether or not to boycott the election; the campaign; and the race
for prime ministership between Rabuka and Josefata Kamikamica. Drama aside,
the elections failed to address some of the fundamental structural problems that
face the people of Fiji and will need to be addressed sooner or later.
